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Psychologists have long been interested in language, but psy-
cholinguistics as a field of study did not emerge until the
1960s. It was motivated by Chomsky’s work in linguistics
and by his claim that the special properties of language re-
quire special mechanisms to handle it (e.g., Chomsky, 1959).
The special feature of language on which Chomsky focused
was its productivity. Possessed with a grammar, or syntax,
humans can produce and understand novel sentences that
carry novel messages. We do this in a way that is exquisitely
sensitive to the structure of the language. For example, we
interpret The umpire helped the child to third base and The
umpire helped the child on third base as conveying distinct
messages, although the sentences differ in just one small
word. We know that He showed her baby the pictures and He
showed her the baby pictures describe quite different events,
even though the difference in word order is slight. We can
even make some sense of Colorless green ideas sleep furi-
ously (Chomsky, 1971), which is semantically anomalous but
syntactically well formed. The same kinds of abilities are
found at other levels of language. We combine morphemes
(units of meaning) in systematic ways, and so understand
Lewis Carroll’s (1871/1977) slithy toves to refer to more
than one tove that has the characteristics of slithiness. And we
can combine phonemes (units of sound) according to the
patterns of our language, accepting slithy but not tlithy as a
potential English word.
Early psycholinguists described our comprehension and
production of language in terms of the rules that were postu-
lated by linguists (Fodor, Bever, & Garrett, 1974). The
connections between psychology and linguistics were partic-
ularly close in the area of syntax, with psycholinguists testing
the psychological reality of various proposed linguistic rules.
As the field of psycholinguistics developed, it became clear
that theories of sentence comprehension and production
cannot be based in any simple way on linguistic theories;
psycholinguistic theories must consider the properties of the
human mind as well as the structure of the language. Psy-
cholinguistics has thus become its own area of inquiry,
informed by but not totally dependent on linguistics.
Although Chomsky and the early psycholinguists focused
on the creative side of language, language also has its rote
side. For example, we store a great deal of information about
the properties of words in our mental lexicon, and we retrieve
this information when we understand or produce language.
According to some views, different kinds of mechanisms are
responsible for the creative and the habitual aspects of lan-
guage, respectively. For example, we may use morpheme-
based rules to decompose a complex word like rewritable the
first few times we encounter it, but after several exposures we
may begin to store and access the word as a unit (Caramazza,
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Laudanna, & Romani, 1988; Schreuder & Baayen, 1995).
Dual-route views of this kind have been proposed in several
areas of psycholinguistics. According to such models, fre-
quency of exposure determines our ability to recall stored in-
stances but not our ability to apply rules. Another idea is that
a single set of mechanisms can handle both the creative side
and the rote side of language. Connectionist theories (see
Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986) take this view. Such theo-
ries claim, for instance, that readers use the same system of
links between spelling units and sound units to generate the
pronunciations of novel written words like tove and to access
the pronunciations of familiar words, be they words that
follow typical spelling-to-sound correspondences, like stove,
or words that are exceptions to these patterns, like love
(e.g., Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996;
Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989). According to this view,
similarity and frequency both play important roles in pro-
cessing, with novel items being processed based on their
similarity to known ones. The patterns are statistical and
probabilistic rather than all-or-none.
Early psycholinguists, following Chomsky’s ideas, tended
to see language as an autonomous system, insulated from
other cognitive systems. In this modular view (see J. A. Fodor,
1983), the initial stages of word and sentence comprehension
are not influenced by higher levels of knowledge. Information
about context and about real-world constraints comes into
play only after the first steps of linguistic processing have
taken place, giving such models a serial quality. In an interac-
tive view, in contrast, knowledge about linguistic context and
about the world plays an immediate role in the comprehension
of words and sentences. In this view, many types of informa-
tion are used in parallel, with the different sources of infor-
mation working cooperatively or competitively to yield an
interpretation. Such ideas are often expressed in connectionist
terms. Modular and interactive views may also be distin-
guished in discussions of language production, in which one
issue is whether there is a syntactic component that operates
independently of conceptual and phonological factors.
Another tension in current-day psycholinguistics concerns
the proper role of linguistics in the field. Work on syntactic
processing, especially in the early days of psycholinguistics,
was very much influenced by developments in linguistics.
Links between linguistics and psycholinguistics have been
less close in other areas, but they do exist. For instance, work
on phonological processing has been influenced by linguistic
accounts of prosody (the melody, rhythm, and stress pattern
of spoken language) and of the internal structure of syllables.
Also, some work on word recognition and language pro-
duction has been influenced by linguistic analyses of mor-
phology (the study of morphemes and their combination).
Although most psycholinguists believe that linguistics pro-
vides an essential foundation for their field, some advocates
of interactive approaches have moved away from a reliance
on linguistic rules and principles and toward a view of lan-
guage in terms of probabilistic patterns (e.g., Seidenberg,
1997).
In this chapter, we describe current views of the compre-
hension and production of spoken and written language by
fluent language users. Although we acknowledge the impor-
tance of social factors in language use, our focus is on core
processes such as parsing and word retrieval that are not
likely to be strongly affected by such factors. We do not have
the space to discuss the important field of developmental psy-
cholinguistics, which deals with the acquisition of language
by children; nor do we cover neurolinguistics, how language
is represented in the brain, nor applied psycholinguistics,




The perception of spoken words would seem to be an ex-
tremely difficult task. Speech is distributed in time, a fleeting
signal that has few reliable cues to the boundaries between
segments and words. The paucity of cues leads to what is
called the segmentation problem, or the problem of how lis-
teners hear a sequence of discrete units even though the
acoustic signal itself is continuous. Other features of speech
could cause difficulty for listeners as well. Certain phonemes
are omitted in conversational speech, others change their pro-
nunciations depending on the surrounding sounds (e.g., /n/
may be pronounced as [m] in lean bacon), and many words
have everyday (or more colloquial) pronunciations (e.g.,
going to frequently becomes gonna). Despite these potential
problems, we usually seem to perceive speech automatically
and with little effort. Whether we do so using procedures that
are unique to speech and that form a specialized speech mod-
ule (Liberman & Mattingly, 1985; see also the chapter by
Fowler in this volume), or whether we do so using more gen-
eral capabilities, it is clear that humans are well adapted for
the perception of speech.
Listeners attempt to map the acoustic signal onto a repre-
sentation in the mental lexicon beginning almost as the signal
starts to arrive. The cohort model, first proposed by Marslen-
Wilson and Welsh (1978), illustrates how this may occur.
According to this theory, the first few phonemes of a spoken
word activate a set or cohort of word candidates that are
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consistent with that input. These candidates compete with
one another for activation. As more acoustic input is ana-
lyzed, candidates that are no longer consistent with the input
drop out of the set. This process continues until only one
word candidate matches the input; the best fitting word may
be chosen if no single candidate is a clear winner. Supporting
this view, listeners sometimes glance first at a picture of a
candy when instructed to “pick up the candle” (Allopenna,
Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998). This result suggests that a
set of words beginning with /kæn/ is briefly activated. Listen-
ers may glance at a picture of a handle, too, suggesting that
the cohort of word candidates also includes words that rhyme
with the target. Indeed, later versions of the cohort theory
(Marslen-Wilson, 1987; 1990) have relaxed the insistence on
perfectly matching input from the very first phoneme of a
word. Other models (McClelland & Elman, 1986; Norris,
1994) also advocate continuous mapping between spoken
input and lexical representations, with the initial portion of
the spoken word exerting a strong but not exclusive influence
on the set of candidates.
The cohort model and the model of McClelland and
Elman (1986) are examples of interactive models, those in
which higher processing levels have a direct, so-called
top-down influence on lower levels. In particular, lexical
knowledge can affect the perception of phonemes. A number
of researchers have found evidence for interactivity in the
form of lexical effects on the perception of sublexical units.
Wurm and Samuel (1997), for example, reported that listen-
ers’ knowledge of words can lead to the inhibition of certain
phonemes. Samuel (1997) found additional evidence of inter-
activity by studying the phenomenon of phonemic restora-
tion. This refers to the fact that listeners continue to “hear”
phonemes that have been removed from the speech signal
and replaced by noise. Samuel discovered that the restored
phonemes produced by lexical activation lead to reliable
shifts in how listeners labeled ambiguous phonemes. This
finding is noteworthy because such shifts are thought to be a
very low-level processing phenomenon.
Modular models, which do not allow top-down perceptual
effects, have had varying success in accounting for some of
the findings just described. The race model of Cutler and
Norris (1979; see also Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2000) is
one example of such a model. The model has two routes that
race each other—a prelexical route, which computes phono-
logical information from the acoustic signal, and a lexical
route, in which the phonological information associated with
a word becomes available when the word itself is accessed.
When word-level information appears to affect a lower-level
process, it is assumed that the lexical route won the race. Im-
portantly, though, knowledge about words never influences
perception at the lower (phonemic) level. There is currently
much discussion about whether all of the experimental find-
ings suggesting top-down effects can be explained in these
terms or whether interactivity is necessary (see Norris et al.,
2000, and the associated commentary).
Although it is a matter of debate whether higher-level
linguistic knowledge affects the initial stages of speech
perception, it is clear that our knowledge of language and its
patterns facilitates perception in some ways. For example,
listeners use phonotactic information such as the fact that ini-
tial /tl/ is illegal in English to help identify phonemes and
word boundaries (Halle, Segui, Frauenfelder, & Meunier,
1998). As another example, listeners use their knowledge that
English words are often stressed on the first syllable to help
parse the speech signal into words (Norris, McQueen, &
Cutler, 1995). These types of knowledge help us solve the
segmentation problem in a language that we know, even
though we perceive an unknown language as an undifferenti-
ated string of sounds.
Printed Word Recognition
Speech is as old as our species and is found in all human civ-
ilizations; reading and writing are newer and less widespread.
These facts lead us to expect that readers would use the visual
representations that are provided by print to recover the
phonological and linguistic structure of the message. Sup-
porting this view, readers often access phonology even when
they are reading silently and even when reliance on phonol-
ogy would tend to hurt their performance. In one study, peo-
ple were asked to quickly decide whether a word belonged to
a specified category (Van Orden, 1987). They were more
likely to misclassify a homophone like meet as a food than to
misclassify a control item like melt as a food. In other studies,
readers were asked to quickly decide whether a printed sen-
tence made sense. Readers with normal hearing were found
to have more trouble with sentences such as He doesn’t like to
eat meet than with sentences such as He doesn’t like to eat
melt. Those who were born deaf, in contrast, did not show a
difference between the two sentence types (Treiman & Hirsh-
Pasek, 1983).
The English writing system, in addition to representing
the sound segments of a word, contains clues to the word’s
stress pattern and morphological structure. Consistent with
the view that print serves as a map of linguistic structure,
readers take advantage of these clues as well. For example,
skilled readers appear to have learned that a word that has
more letters than strictly necessary in its second syllable
(e.g., -ette rather than -et) is likely to be an exception to the
generalization that English words are typically stressed on
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the first syllable. In a lexical decision task, where participants
must quickly decide whether a letter string is a real word,
they perform better with words such as cassette, whose
stressed second syllable is spelled with -ette, than with words
such as palette, which has final -ette but first-syllable stress
(Kelly, Morris, & Verrekia, 1998). Skilled readers also use
the clues to morphological structure that are embedded in
English orthography. For example, they know that the prefix
re- can stand before free morphemes such as print and do,
yielding the two-morpheme words reprint and redo. Encoun-
tering vive in a lexical decision task, participants may
wrongly judge it to be a word because of their familiarity
with revive (Taft & Forster, 1975).
Although there is good evidence that phonology and other
aspects of linguistic structure are retrieved in reading (see
Frost, 1998, for a review), there are a number of questions
about how linguistic structure is derived from print. One idea,
which is embodied in dual-route theories such as that of
Coltheart, Rastle, Perry, Langdon, and Ziegler (2001), is that
two different processes are available for converting ortho-
graphic representations to phonological representations. A
lexical route is used to look up the phonological forms of
known words in the mental lexicon; this procedure yields
correct pronunciations for exception words such as love. A
nonlexical route accounts for the productivity of reading: It
generates pronunciations for novel letter strings (e.g., tove) as
well as for regular words (e.g., stove) on the basis of smaller
units. This latter route gives incorrect pronunciations for
exception words, so that these words may be pronounced
slowly or erroneously (e.g., love said as /lov/) in speeded
word-naming tasks (e.g., Glushko, 1979). In contrast, con-
nectionist theories claim that a single set of connections from
orthography to phonology can account for performance on
both regular words and exception words (e.g., Plaut et al.,
1996; Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989).
Another question about orthography-to-phonology trans-
lation concerns its grain size. English, which has been the
subject of much of the research on word recognition, has a
rather irregular writing system. For example, ea corresponds
to /i/ in bead but // in dead; c is /k/ in cat but /s/ in city. Such
irregularities are particularly common for vowels. Quantita-
tive analyses have shown, however, that consideration of the
consonant that follows a vowel can often help to specify the
vowel’s pronunciation (Kessler & Treiman, 2001; Treiman,
Mullennix, Bijeljac-Babic, & Richmond-Welty, 1995). The
// pronunciation of ea, for example, is more likely before d
than before m. Such considerations have led to the pro-
posal that readers of English often use letter groups that cor-
respond to the syllable rime (the vowel nucleus plus an
optional consonantal coda) in spelling-to-sound translation
(see Bowey, 1990; Treiman et al., 1995, for supporting
evidence). In more regular alphabets, such as Dutch,
spelling-to-sound translation can be successfully performed
at a small grain size and rime-based processing may not be
needed (Martensen, Maris, & Dijkstra, 2000).
Researchers have also asked whether a phonological form,
once activated, feeds activation back to the orthographic
level. If so, a word such as heap may be harder to process
than otherwise expected because its phonological form, /hip/,
would be consistent with the spelling heep as well as with the
actual heap. Some studies have found evidence for feedback
of this kind (e.g., Stone, Vanhoy, & Van Orden, 1997), but
others have not (e.g., Peereman, Content, & Bonin, 1998).
Because spoken words are spread out in time, as discussed
earlier, spoken word recognition is generally considered a se-
quential process. With many printed words, however, the eye
takes in all of the letters during a single fixation (Rayner &
Pollatsek, 1989). The connectionist models of reading cited
earlier maintain that all phonemes of a word are activated in
parallel. Current dual-route theories, in contrast, claim that
the assembly process operates in a serial fashion such that the
phonological forms of the leftmost elements are delivered be-
fore those for the succeeding elements (Coltheart et al.,
2001). Still another view (Berent & Perfetti, 1995) is that
consonants, whatever their position, are translated into pho-
nological form before vowels. These issues are the subject of
current research and debate (see Lee, Rayner, & Pollatsek,
2001; Lukatela & Turvey, 2000; Rastle & Coltheart, 1999;
Zorzi, 2000).
Progress in determining how linguistic representations are
derived from print will be made as researchers move beyond
the short, monosyllabic words that have been the focus of
much current research and modeling. In addition, experimen-
tal techniques that involve the brief presentation of stimuli
and the tracking of eye movements are contributing useful in-
formation. These methods supplement the naming tasks and
lexical decision tasks that are used in much of the research on
single-word reading (see chapter by Rayner, Pollatsek, &
Starr in this volume for further discussion of eye movements
and reading). Although many questions remain to be an-
swered, it is clear that the visual representations provided by
print rapidly make contact with the representations stored in
the mental lexicon. After this contact has been made, it mat-
ters little whether the initial input was by eye or by ear. The
principles and processing procedures are much the same.
The Mental Lexicon
So far, in discussing how listeners and readers access informa-
tion in the mental lexicon, we have not said much about the na-
ture of the information that they access. It is to this topic that
we now turn. One question that relates to the trade-off between
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computation and storage in language processing is whether
the mental lexicon is organized by morphemes or by words.
According to a word-based view, the lexicon contains repre-
sentations of all words that the language user knows, whether
they are single-morpheme words such as cat or polymor-
phemic words such as beautifully. Supporting this view, Tyler,
Marslen-Wilson, Rentoul, and Hanney (1988) found that
spoken-word recognition performance was related to when
the word began to diverge from other words in the mental lex-
icon, as predicted by the cohort model, but was not related to
morphemic predictors of where recognition should take place.
According to a morpheme-based view, in contrast, the lexicon
is organized in terms of morphemes such as beauty, ful, and ly.
In this view, complex words are processed and represented in
terms of such units.
The study by Taft and Forster (1975) brought morpholog-
ical issues to the attention of many psychologists and pointed
to some form of morpheme-based storage. As mentioned ear-
lier, these researchers found that nonwords such as vive
(which is found in revive) were difficult to reject in a lexical
decision task. Participants also had trouble with items such as
dejuvenate which, although not a real word, consists of
genuine prefix together with a genuine root. Taft and Forster
interpreted their results to suggest that access to the mental
lexicon is based on root morphemes and that obligatory de-
composition must precede word recognition for polymor-
phemic words.
More recent studies suggest that there are in fact two
routes to recognition for polymorphemic words, one based on
morphological analysis and the other based on whole-word
storage. In one instantiation of this dual-route view, morpho-
logically complex words are simultaneously analyzed as
whole words and in terms of morphemes. In the model of
Wurm (1997, Wurm & Ross, 2001), for instance, the system
maintains a representation of which morphemes can com-
bine, and in what ways. A potential word root is checked
against a list of free roots that have combined in the past with
the prefix in question. In another instantiation of the dual-
route view, some morphologically complex words are de-
composed and others are not. For example, Marslen-Wilson,
Tyler, Waksler, and Older (1994) argued that semantically
opaque words such as organize and casualty are treated by
listeners and readers as monomorphemic and are not decom-
posed no matter how many morphemes they technically con-
tain. Commonly encountered words may also be treated as
wholes rather than in terms of morphemes (Caramazza et al.,
1988; Schreuder & Baayen, 1995). Although morphological
decomposition may not always take place, the evidence we
have reviewed suggests that the lexicon is organized, in part,
in terms of morphemes. This organization helps explain our
ability to make some sense of slithy and toves.
Ambiguous words, or those with more than one meaning,
might be expected to cause difficulties in lexical processing.
Researchers have been interested in ambiguity because stud-
ies of this issue may provide insight into whether processing
at the lexical level is influenced by information at higher
levels or whether it is modular. In the former case, compre-
henders would be expected to access only the contextually
appropriate meaning of a word. In the latter case, all mean-
ings should be retrieved and context should have its ef-
fects only after the initial processing has taken place. The
original version of the cohort model (Marslen-Wilson &
Welsh, 1978) adopts an interactive view when it states that
context acts directly on cohort membership. However, later
versions of cohort theory (Marslen-Wilson, 1987; 1990;
Moss & Marslen-Wilson, 1993) hold that context has its
effects at a later, integrative stage.
Initially, it appears, both meanings of an ambiguous mor-
pheme are looked up in many cases. This may even occur
when the preceding context would seem to favor one mean-
ing over the other. In one representative study (Gernsbacher
& Faust, 1991), participants read sentences such as Jack tried
the punch but he didn’t think it tasted very good. After the
word punch had been presented, an upper-case letter string
was presented and participants were asked to decide whether
it was a real word. Of interest were lexical decision targets
such as hit (which are related to an unintended meaning of
the ambiguous word) and drink (which are related to the in-
tended meaning). When the target was presented immedi-
ately after the participant had read punch, performance was
speeded on both hit and drink. This result suggests that even
the contextually inappropriate meaning of the ambiguous
morpheme was activated. The initial lack of contextual ef-
fects in this and other studies (e.g., Swinney, 1979) supports
the idea that lexical access is a modular process, uninfluenced
by higher-level syntactic and semantic constraints.
Significantly, Gernsbacher and Faust (1991) found a dif-
ferent pattern of results when the lexical decision task was
delayed by a half second or so but still preceded the follow-
ing word of the sentence. In this case, drink remained active
but hit did not. Gernsbacher and Faust interpreted these re-
sults to mean that comprehenders initially access all mean-
ings of an ambiguous word but then actively suppress the
meaning (or meanings) that does not fit the context. This sup-
pression process, they contend, is more efficient in better
comprehenders than in poorer comprehenders. Because the
inappropriate meaning is quickly suppressed, the reader or
listener is typically not aware of the ambiguity.
Although all meanings of an ambiguous word may be ac-
cessed initially in many cases, this may not always be so (see
Simpson, 1994). For example, when one meaning of an am-
biguous word is much more frequent than the other or when
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the context very strongly favors one meaning, the other
meaning may show little or no activation. It has thus been dif-
ficult to provide a clear answer to the question of whether
lexical access is modular.
The preceding discussion considered words that have two
or more unrelated meanings. More common are polysemous
words, which have several senses that are related to one an-
other. For example, paper can refer to a substance made of
wood pulp or to an article that is typically written on that sub-
stance but that nowadays may be written and published elec-
tronically. Processing a polysemous word in one of its senses
can make it harder to subsequently comprehend the word in
another of its senses (Klein & Murphy, 2001). That one sense
can be activated and the other suppressed suggests to these
researchers that at least some senses have separate represen-
tations, just as the different meanings of a morpheme like
punch have separate representations.
Problems with ambiguity are potentially greater in bilin-
gual than in monolingual individuals. For example, leek has a
single sense for a monolingual speaker of English, but it has
another meaning, layperson, for one who also knows Dutch.
When asked to decide whether printed words are English,
and when the experimental items included some exclusively
Dutch words, Dutch-English bilinguals were found to have
more difficulty with words such as leek than with appropriate
control words such as pox (Dijkstra, Timmermans, &
Schriefers, 2000). Such results suggest that the Dutch lexicon
is activated along with the English one in this situation. Al-
though optimal performance could be achieved by deactivat-
ing the irrelevant language, bilinguals are sometimes unable
to do this. Further evidence for this view comes from a study
in which Russian-English bilinguals were asked, in Russian,
to pick up objects such as a marku (stamp; Spivey & Marian,
1999). When a marker was also present—an object whose
English name is similar to marku—people sometimes looked
at it before looking at the stamp and carrying out the instruc-
tion. Although English was not used during the experimental
session, the bilinguals appeared unable to ignore the irrele-
vant lexicon.
Information about the meanings of words and about the
concepts that they represent is also linked to lexical represen-
tations. The chapter in this volume by Goldstone and Kersten
includes a discussion of conceptual representation.
Comprehension of Sentences and Discourse
Important as word recognition is, understanding language re-
quires far more than adding the meanings of the individual
words together. We must combine the meanings in ways that
honor the grammar of the language and that are sensitive to
the possibility that language is being used in a metaphoric or
nonliteral manner (see Cacciari & Glucksberg, 1994). Psy-
cholinguists have addressed the phenomena of sentence com-
prehension in different ways. Some theorists have focused on
the fact that the sentence comprehension system continually
creates novel representations of novel messages, following
the constraints of a language’s grammar, and does so with
remarkable speed. Others have emphasized that the compre-
hension system is sensitive to a vast range of information,
including grammatical, lexical, and contextual, as well as
knowledge of the speaker or writer and of the world in gen-
eral. Theorists in the former group (e.g., Ford, Bresnan, &
Kaplan, 1982; Frazier & Rayner, 1982; Pritchett, 1992) have
constructed modular, serial models that describe how the
processor quickly constructs one or more representations of a
sentence based on a restricted range of information, primarily
grammatical information, that is guaranteed to be relevant to
its interpretation. Any such representation is then quickly in-
terpreted and evaluated, using the full range of information
that might be relevant. Theorists in the latter group (e.g.,
MacDonald, Pearlmutter & Seidenberg, 1994; Tanenhaus &
Trueswell, 1995) have constructed parallel models, often of a
connectionist nature, describing how the processor uses all
relevant information to quickly evaluate the full range of pos-
sible interpretations of a sentence (see Pickering, 1999, for
discussion).
Neither of the two approaches just described provides a
full account of how the sentence processing mechanism
works. Modular models, by and large, do not adequately deal
with how interpretation occurs, how the full range of infor-
mation relevant to interpretation is integrated, or how the ini-
tial representation is revised when necessary (but see J. D.
Fodor & Ferreira, 1998, for a beginning on the latter ques-
tion). Parallel models, for the most part, do not adequately
deal with how the processor constructs or activates the vari-
ous interpretations whose competitive evaluation they de-
scribe (see Frazier, 1995). However, both approaches have
motivated bodies of research that have advanced our knowl-
edge of language comprehension, and new models are being
developed that have the promise of overcoming the limita-
tions of the models that have guided research in the past
(Gibson, 1998; Jurafsky, 1996; Vosse & Kempen, 2000).
Structural Factors in Comprehension 
Comprehension of written and spoken language can be diffi-
cult, in part, because it is not always easy to identify the con-
stituents (phrases) of a sentence and the ways in which
they relate to one another. The place of a particular con-
stituent within the grammatical structure may be temporarily
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or permanently ambiguous. Studies of how people resolve
grammatical ambiguities, like studies of how they resolve
lexical ambiguities, have provided insights into the processes
of language comprehension. Consider the sentence The sec-
ond wife will claim the inheritance belongs to her. When the
inheritance first appears, it could be interpreted as either the
direct object of claim or the subject of belongs. Frazier and
Rayner (1982) found that readers’ eyes fixated for longer than
usual on the verb belongs, which disambiguates the sentence.
They interpreted this result to mean that readers first inter-
preted the inheritance as a direct object. Readers were dis-
rupted when they had to revise this initial interpretation to the
one in which the inheritance is subject of belongs. Following
Bever (1970), Frazier and Rayner described their readers as
being led down a garden path. Readers are led down the gar-
den path, Frazier and Rayner claimed, because the direct-
object analysis is structurally simpler than the other possible
analysis. These researchers proposed a principle, minimal at-
tachment, which defined the phrase structurally simpler, and
they claimed that structural simplicity guides all initial analy-
ses. In this view, the sentence processor constructs a single
analysis of a sentence and attempts to interpret it. The first
analysis is the one that requires the fewest applications of
grammatical rules to attach each incoming word into the
structure being built; it is the automatic consequence of an ef-
fort to get some analysis constructed as soon as possible.
Many researchers have tested and confirmed the minimal at-
tachment principle for a variety of sentence types (see Frazier
& Clifton, 1996, for a review).
Minimal attachment is not the only principle that has been
proposed as governing how readers and listeners use gram-
matical knowledge in parsing. Another principle that has re-
ceived substantial support is late closure (Frazier, 1987a).
Frazier and Rayner (1982) provided some early support for
this principle by showing disruption on the phrase seems like
in Since Jay always jogs a mile seems like a very short dis-
tance to him. Here, a mile is first taken to be the direct object
of jogs because the processor tries to relate it to the phrase
currently being processed. Reading is disrupted when a mile
must be reanalyzed as the subject of seems.
Another principle is some version of prefer argument
(e.g., Abney, 1989; Konieczny, Hemforth, Scheepers, &
Strube, 1997; Pritchett, 1992). Grammars often distinguish
between arguments and adjuncts. An argument is a phrase
whose relation to a verb or other argument assigner is lexi-
cally specified; an adjunct is related to what it modifies in a
less specific fashion (see Schütze & Gibson, 1999). With the
sentence Joe expressed his interest in the car, the prefer argu-
ment principle predicts that a reader will attach in the car to
the noun interest rather than to the verb express, even though
the latter analysis is structurally simpler and preferred ac-
cording to minimal attachment. In the car is an argument of
interest (the nature of its relation to interest is specified by the
word interest) but an adjunct of express (it states the location
of the action just as it would for any action). Substantial evi-
dence suggests that the argument analysis is preferred in the
end (Clifton, Speer, & Abney, 1991; Konieczny et al., 1997;
Schütze & Gibson, 1999). However, some evidence suggests
a brief initial preference for the minimal attachment analysis
(Clifton et al., 1991).
Long-distance dependencies, like ambiguities, can cause
problems in the parsing of language. Language gains much of
its expressive power from its recursive properties: Sentences
can be placed inside sentences, without limit. This means that
related phrases can be distant from one another. Many lin-
guists describe constructions like Who did you see t at the zoo
and The girl I saw t at the zoo was my sister as having an
empty element, a trace (symbolized by t), in the position
where the moved element (who and the girl) must be inter-
preted. Psycholinguists who have adopted this analysis ask
how the sentence processor discovers the relation between
the moved element (or filler) and the trace (or gap). One pos-
sibility, J. D. Fodor (1978) suggested, is that the processor
might delay filler-gap assignment as long as possible. How-
ever, there is evidence that the processor actually identifies
the gap as soon as possible, an active filler strategy (Frazier,
1987b).
The active filler strategy is closely related to minimal
attachment, for both strategies attempt to find some gram-
matical analysis of a sentence as soon as possible (see De
Vincenzi, 1991). But the active filler strategy may not be
the whole story. Pickering and Barry (1991) and Boland,
Tanenhaus, Garnsey, and Carlson (1995) proposed what the
latter called a direct assignment strategy, according to which
a filler is semantically interpreted as soon as a reader or lis-
tener encounters the verb to which it is related, without wait-
ing for the gap position. Evidence for this strategy comes
from a study in which Boland et al. presented sentences word
by word, asking readers to indicate when and if a sentence
became unacceptable. An implausible sentence like Which
public library did John contribute some cheap liquor to t last
week tended to be rejected right on the word liquor, before the
position of the gap.
Lexical and Contextual Factors in Comprehension 
Most of the phenomena discussed so far show that preferences
for certain structural relations play an important role in sen-
tence comprehension. However, as syntactic theory has shifted
away from describing particular structural configurations and
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toward specifying lexical information that constrains possible
grammatical relations, many psycholinguists have proposed
that the human sentence processor is primarily guided by in-
formation about specific words that is stored in the lexicon.
The research on comprehenders’ preference for arguments
discussed earlier is one example of this move, as is the research
by Boland et al. (1995) on long-distance dependencies
(see Tanenhaus, Boland, Mauner, & Carlson, 1993, for further
discussion).
Spivey-Knowlton and Sedivy (1995) demonstrated effects
of particular categories of lexical items, as well as effects of
discourse structure, in the comprehension of sentences like
The salesman glanced at a/the customer with suspicion/ripped
jeans. The prepositional phrases with suspicion or with ripped
jeans could modify either the verb glance or the noun cus-
tomer. Minimal attachment favors the former analysis, but
Spivey-Knowlton and Sedivy showed that this held true only
for action verbs like smash down, not for perception verbs like
glance at. The researchers further noted that an actual prefer-
ence for noun phrase modification only appeared when the
noun had the indefinite article a. This outcome, they sug-
gested, points to the importance of discourse factors (such
as whether an entity is newly referred to or not) in sentence
comprehension.
Some theorists (e.g., Altmann & Steedman, 1988) have
proposed that contextual appropriateness guides parsing and
indeed is responsible for the effects that have previously been
attributed to structural factors such as minimal attachment.
The basic claim of their referential theory is that, for a phrase
to modify a definite noun phrase, there must be two or more
possible referents of the noun phrase in the discourse context.
For instance, in the sentence The burglar blew open a safe
with the dynamite, treatment of with the dynamite as modify-
ing a safe is claimed to presuppose the existence of two or
more safes, one of which contains dynamite. If multiple safes
had not been mentioned, the sentence processor must either
infer the existence of other safes or must analyze the phrase
in another way, for example as specifying an instrument of
blow open. Supporters of referential theory have argued that
the out-of-context preferences that have been taken to sup-
port principles like minimal attachment disappear when sen-
tences are presented in appropriate discourse contexts. In one
study, Altmann and Steedman examined how long readers
took on sentences like The burglar blew open the safe
with the dynamite/new lock and made off with the loot in con-
texts that had introduced either one safe or two safes, one
with a new lock. The version containing with the dyna-
mite was read faster in the one-safe context, in which the
phrase modified the verb and thus satisfied minimal attach-
ment. The version containing with the new lock was read
faster in the two-safe context, fitting referential theory.
Many studies have examined effects like the one just de-
scribed (see Mitchell, 1994, for a summary). It is clear
that the use of a definite noun phrase when the discourse con-
text contains two possible referents disrupts reading. This re-
sult shows once again that interpretation is nearly immediate
and that reading is disrupted when unambiguous interpreta-
tion is blocked. A context that provides two referents can
eliminate the disruption observed out of context when a
phrase must modify a noun, at least when the out-of-context
structural preference is weak (Britt, 1994). When the out-of-
context bias is strong (as in the case of reduced relative
clauses, like Bever’s The horse raced past the barn fell;
1970), a context that satisfies the presumed referential pre-
suppositions of a modifier reduces the amount of disruption
rather than eliminating it.
Given the wide variety of factors that seem to affect sen-
tence comprehension, some psycholinguists have developed
lexicalist, constraint-based theories of sentence processing
(e.g., MacDonald et al., 1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell,
1995). These theories, which are described and sometimes
implemented in connectionist terms, assume that multiple
possible interpretations of a sentence are available to the
processor. Each possible interpretation receives activation (or
inhibition) from some knowledge sources, as well as (gener-
ally) being inhibited by the other interpretations. Competi-
tion among the interpretations eventually results in the
dominance of a single one. Increased competition is respon-
sible for the effects that the theories discussed earlier have at-
tributed to the need to revise an analysis. Constraint-based
theories can accommodate influences of specific lexical in-
formation, context, verb category, and many other factors,
and they have encouraged the search for additional influ-
ences. However, they may not be the final word on sentence
processing. These theories correctly predict that a variety of
factors can reduce or eliminate garden-path effects when a
temporarily ambiguous sentence is resolved in favor of an
analysis that is not normally preferred (e.g., nonminimal at-
tachment). But the constraint-based theories also predict that
these factors will create garden paths when the sentence is re-
solved in favor of its normally preferred analysis. This may
not always be the case (Binder, Duffy, & Rayner, 2001).
Competitive constraint-based theories, like other connec-
tionist theories, grant a major role to frequency. Frequent
constructions should be more readily activated by appropri-
ate sources of information than less common constructions
are. Supporting this view, readers understand sentences like
The award accepted by the man was very impressive more
readily when the first verb is frequently used as a passive par-
ticiple, as accept is, than when the verb is not frequently used
as a passive particle, as with search (Trueswell, 1996). Also,
reduced relative-clause sentences, such as The rancher could
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see that the nervous cattle pushed/moved into the crowded
pen were afraid of the cowboys, are read more rapidly when
the verb of the complement sentence is more often used as a
transitive verb (push) than when it is more often used as an
intransitive verb (move; MacDonald, 1994). The frequency
of particular constructions may not always predict compre-
hension preferences and comprehension difficulty (Gibson,
Schütze, & Salomon, 1996; Kennison, 2001; Pickering,
Traxler, & Crocker, 2000). However, theorists such as Juraf-
sky (1996) have made a strong case that the frequency of
exposure to certain constructions is a major factor guiding
sentence comprehension.
Competitive constraint-based theories have also empha-
sized discourse and situational context as constraints on sen-
tence comprehension. Researchers have taken advantage of
the fact that listeners quickly direct their eyes to the referents
of what they hear, as shown by the Allopenna et al. (1998)
study mentioned in the earlier discussion of spoken word
recognition, to study how comprehension is guided by situa-
tional context. Spivey, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, and Sedivy (in
press) found that, when a listener hears a command like Put
the cup on the napkin under the book, the eyes move quickly
to an empty napkin when the context contains just one cup,
even if the cup had been on a napkin. This result suggests that
on the napkin was taken as the goal argument of put. How-
ever, when the context contains two cups, only one on a nap-
kin, the eyes do not move to an empty napkin. This result
suggests that the situational context overrode the default
preference to take the on-phrase as an argument. Related
work explores how quickly knowledge of the roles objects
typically play in events is used in determining the reference
of phrases. In one study, people observed a scene on a video
display and judged the appropriateness of an auditory sen-
tence describing the scene (Altmann & Kamide, 1999). Their
eyes moved faster to a relevant target when the verb in the
sentence was commonly used with the target item. For in-
stance, when people heard The boy will eat the cake their
eyes moved more quickly to a picture of a cake than when
they heard The boy will move the cake.
Comprehension of Text and Discourse 
The research just described shows how quickly listeners inte-
grate grammatical and situational knowledge in understand-
ing a sentence. Integration is also important across sentence
boundaries. Sentences come in texts and discourses, and the
entire text or discourse is relevant to the messages conveyed.
Researchers have examined how readers and listeners deter-
mine whether referring expressions, especially pronouns and
noun phrases, pick out a new entity or one that was intro-
duced earlier in the discourse. They have studied how readers
and listeners determine the relations between one assertion
and earlier assertions, including determining what unex-
pressed assertions follow as implications of what was heard
or read. Many studies have examined how readers and listen-
ers create a nonlinguistic representation of the content, one
that supports the functions of determining reference, rele-
vance, and implications (see the several chapters on text and
discourse comprehension in Gernsbacher, 1994, and also
Garnham, 1999, and Sanford, 1999, for summaries of this
work).
Much research on text comprehension has been guided by
the work of Kintsch (1974; Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978; see
chapter in this volume by Butcher & Kintsch), who has pro-
posed a series of models of the process by which the proposi-
tions that make up the semantic interpretations of individual
sentences are integrated into such larger structures. His
models describe ways in which readers could abstract the
main threads of a discourse and infer missing connections,
constrained by limitations of short-term memory and guided
by how arguments overlap across propositions and by lin-
guistic cues signaled by the text.
One line of research explores how a text or discourse
makes contact with knowledge in long-term memory (e.g.,
Kintsch, 1988), including material introduced earlier in a
discourse. Some research emphasizes how retrieval of infor-
mation from long-term memory can be a passive process
that occurs automatically throughout comprehension (e.g.,
McKoon & Ratcliff, 1998; Myers & O’Brien, 1998). In the
Myers and O’Brien resonance model, information in long-
term memory is automatically activated by the presence
in short-term memory of material that apparently bears a
rough semantic relation to it. Semantic details, including fac-
tors such as negation that drastically change the truth of
propositions, do not seem to affect the resonance process.
Other research has emphasized a more active and intelligent
search for meaning as the basis by which a reader discovers
the conceptual structure of a discourse. Graesser, Singer, and
Trabasso (1994) argued that a reader of a narrative text at-
tempts to build a representation of the causal structure of the
text, analyzing events in terms of goals, actions, and reac-
tions. Another view (Rizzella & O’Brien, 1996) is that a res-
onance process serves as a first stage in processing a text and
that reading objectives and details of text structure determine
whether a reader goes further and searches for a coherent
goal structure for the text.
Modality-Specific Factors 
The theories and phenomena that we have discussed so far
apply to comprehension of both spoken language and written
language. One challenge that is specific to listening comes
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from the evanescent nature of speech. People cannot relisten
to what they have just heard in the way that readers can move
their eyes back in the text. However, the fact that humans are
adapted through evolution to process auditory (vs. written)
language suggests that this may not be such a problem. Audi-
tory sensory memory can hold information for up to several
seconds (Cowan, 1984; see chapter by Nairne in this vol-
ume), and so language that is heard may in fact persist for
longer than language that is read, permitting effective revi-
sion. In addition, auditory structure may facilitate short-term
memory for spoken language. Imposing a rhythm on the
items in a to-be-remembered list can help people remember
them (Ryan, 1969), and prosody may aid memory for sen-
tences as well (Speer, Crowder, & Thomas, 1993). Prosody
may also guide the parsing and interpretation of utterances
(see Warren, 1999). For example, prosody can help resolve
lexical and syntactic ambiguities, it can signal the impor-
tance, novelty, and contrastive value of phrases, and it can re-
late newly heard information to the prior discourse. If readers
translate visually presented sentences into a phonological
form, complete with prosody, these benefits may extend to
reading (Bader, 1998; Slowiaczek & Clifton, 1980).
Consider how prosody can permit listeners to avoid the
kinds of garden paths that have been observed in reading
(Frazier & Rayner, 1982). Several researchers (see Warren,
1999) have demonstrated that prosody can disambiguate ut-
terances. In particular, an intonational phrase boundary
(marked by pausing, lengthening, and tonal movement) can
signal the listener that a syntactic phrase is ending (see
Selkirk, 1984, for discussion of the relation between prosodic
and syntactic boundaries). Recent evidence for this conclu-
sion comes from a study by Kjelgaard and Speer (1999) that
examined ambiguities like When Madonna sings the song
it’s/is a hit. Readers, as mentioned earlier, initially take the
phrase the song as the direct object of sings. This results in a
garden path when the sentence continues with is, forcing
readers to reinterpret the role of the song. Kjelgaard and
Speer found that such difficulties were eliminated when these
kinds of sentences were supplied with appropriate prosodies.
The relevant prosodic property does not seem to be simply
the occurrence of a local cue, such as an intonational
phrase break (Schafer, 1997). Rather, the effectiveness of a
prosodic boundary seems to depend on its relation to certain
other boundaries (Carlson, Clifton & Frazier, 2001), even the
global prosodic representation of a sentence.
Written language carries some information that is not
available in the auditory signal. For example, word bound-
aries are explicitly indicated in many languages, and readers
seldom have to suffer the kinds of degradation in signal
quality that are commonly experienced by listeners in noisy
environments. However, writing lacks the full range of
grammatically relevant prosodic information that is available
in speech. Punctuation has value in that it restores some of
this information (see Hill & Murray, 1998). For instance,
readers can use the comma in Since Jay always jogs, a mile
seems like a very short distance to him to avoid misinterpre-
tation. Readers also seem to be sensitive to line breaks, para-
graph marking, and the like. Their comprehension improves,
for example, when line breaks in a text correspond to major
constituent boundaries (Clark & Clark, 1977, pp. 51–52).
LANGUAGE PRODUCTION
As we have discussed, comprehenders must map the spoken
or written input onto entries in the mental lexicon and must
generate various levels of syntactic, semantic, and conceptual
structure. In language production, people are faced with the
converse problem. They must map from a conceptual struc-
ture to words and their elements. In this section, we first dis-
cuss how people produce single words and then turn to the
production of longer utterances. Our discussion concentrates
on spoken language production, which has been the focus of
most of the research on language production. We then con-
sider how the representations and processes involved in writ-
ing differ from those involved in speaking.
Access to Single Words in Spoken Language Production
To give an overview of how speakers generate single words,
we first summarize the model of lexical access proposed by
Levelt, Roelofs, and Meyer (1999; see Roelofs, 1997, for a
computational model implementing key parts of the theory).
Like most other models of word production, this model claims
that words are planned in several processing steps. Each step
generates a specific type of representation, and information is
transmitted between representations via the spreading of acti-
vation. The first processing step, called conceptualization, is
deciding what notion to express. For instance, a speaker can
say “the baby,” “Emilio,” “Her Majesty’s grandson,” or sim-
ply “he” to refer to a small person in a highchair. In making
such a choice, the speaker considers a variety of things, in-
cluding whether the person has been mentioned before
and whether the listener is likely to know the proper name of
the person being discussed (see Clark, 1996; Levelt, 1989, for
discussions of conceptualization and the role of social factors
therein).
The next step is to select a word that corresponds to the
chosen concept. In the view of Levelt et al. (1999), the speaker
first selects a lemma, or syntactic word unit. Lemmas specify
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the syntactic class of the word and often additional syntactic
information, such as whether a verb is intransitive (e.g., sleep)
or transitive (e.g., eat) and, if transitive, what arguments it
takes. Lemma selection is a competitive process. Several lem-
mas may be activated at the same time because several con-
cepts are more or less suitable to express the message, and
because lemmas that correspond to semantically similar con-
cepts activate each other via links to shared superordinate
concepts or conceptual features. A lemma is selected as soon
as its activation level exceeds the summed activation of all
competitors. A checking mechanism ascertains that the se-
lected lemma indeed maps onto the intended concept.
The following processing step, morphophonological en-
coding, begins with the retrieval of the morphemes corre-
sponding to the selected lemma. For the lemma baby there is
only one morpheme to retrieve, but for grandson or walked
two morphemes must be retrieved. Evidence that speakers
access morphological information comes from a variety
of sources. For instance, people sometimes make speech er-
rors such as “imagine getting your model renosed,” in which
stems exchange while affixes remain in place (Fromkin,
1971). Other evidence shows that morphologically related
primes have different effects on the production of target
words than do semantically or phonologically related primes
(e.g., Roelofs, 1996; Zwitserlood, Boelte, & Dohmes, 2000).
Priming experiments have also shown that morphemes are
accessed in sequence, according to their order in the utter-
ance (e.g., Roelofs, 1996).
In the model of Levelt et al. (1999), the next processing step
is the generation of the phonological form of the word. Word
forms are not simply retrieved as units, but are first decom-
posed into individual segments (or perhaps segments and cer-
tain groups of segments, such as /st/), which are subsequently
mapped onto prosodic patterns. The most convincing evi-
dence for phonological decomposition stems from studies of
speech errors (e.g., Fromkin, 1971). Speakers sometimes
make errors in which they replace or misorder single
phonemes, as in perry pie instead of cherry pie. These errors
show that the words’ segments constitute processing units; if
word forms were retrieved as units, such errors could not
occur. Thus, for the word baby, the segments /b/, /e/, /b/, /i/ are
retrieved. In the model of Levelt et al., the string of segments
is subsequently syllabified following the syllabification rules
of the language and is assigned stress. Many words are
stressed according to simple default rules: For example, bisyl-
labic English words are usually stressed on the first syllable.
For words that deviate from these rules, stress information is
stored in the lexicon. During phonological encoding, the seg-
mental and stress information are combined. Results from a
large number of experiments using various types of priming
and interference paradigms suggest that all phonemes of a
word may be activated at the same time, but that the formation
of syllables is a sequential process, proceeding from the be-
ginning of the word to the end (e.g., Meyer, 1991; Meyer &
Schriefers, 1991; O’Seaghdha & Marin, 2000).
The phonological representation of a word is abstract in
that it consists of discrete, nonoverlapping segments, which
define static positions of the vocal tract or states of the
acoustic signal to be attained, and in that the definitions of the
segments are independent of the contexts in which they ap-
pear. However, actual speech movements overlap in time,
and they are continuous and context-dependent. The final
planning step for a word is the generation of a phonetic rep-
resentation, which specifies the articulatory gestures to be
carried out and their timing. There may be syllable-sized rou-
tines for frequent syllables that can be retrieved as units and
unpacked during articulation (e.g., Levelt & Wheeldon,
1994). The chapter by Fowler in this volume discusses the
generation and execution of articulatory commands.
All current models of word production distinguish
among conceptual processes, word retrieval processes, and
articulatory processes. The models differ in the types of repre-
sentations they postulate at each level and in their assump-
tions about processing. One important representational issue
is whether it is useful to assume lemmas as purely syntactic
units and to postulate separate units representing word forms,
or whether there are lexical units that encompass both syntac-
tic and word-form information. Relevant evidence comes
from experiments that use reaction times and measures of
brain activity to trace how syntactic and form information is
retrieved across time (e.g., van Turennout, Hagoort, & Brown,
1998). Also relevant are analyses of tip-of-the-tongue states,
in which speakers can only retrieve part of the information
pertaining to a word—for example, its grammatical gender
but not its form (e.g., Vigliocco, Antonini, & Garrett, 1997).
How these findings should be interpreted is still a matter of
debate (see Caramazza & Miozzo, 1997; Roelofs, Meyer, &
Levelt, 1998). Representational issues also arise at the phono-
logical level. In the model of Levelt et al. (1999), segments are
associated to unitary syllable nodes without internal structure.
In other models, syllables are frames with slots corresponding
to subsyllabic units (onset and rime, or onset, nucleus, and
coda; see Dell, 1986) or consonantal and vocalic positions
(Dell, 1988; O’Seaghdha & Marin, 2000).
Models of language production also differ in the emphasis
that they place on storage versus computation. Levelt et al.
(1999) emphasize computation. In their view, stress is com-
puted rather than stored when possible. Also, even common
forms like walked are derived by the combination of stems
and affixes. Other models assume that some information that
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could in principle be computed is stored in the lexicon. For
example, stress may be stored for all entries, and forms such
as walked may be retrieved as wholes (e.g., Stemberger &
MacWhinney, 1986).
In all models of language production, the main direction
of processing is from the conceptual level to articulation.
Some production models, like some comprehension models,
assume serial processing stages such that processing at one
level must finish before processing at the next level can
begin. Other models assume cascaded processing, whereby
each activated unit immediately spreads activation to its sub-
ordinate units (e.g., Humphreys, Price, & Riddoch, 2000;
MacKay, 1987). Some cascading models permit feedback
from lower to higher levels of processing (e.g., Dell, 1986,
1988; Dell, Schwartz, Martin, Saffran, & Gagnon, 1997). In
serial stage models, in which higher-level processing is com-
pleted before lower-level processing begins, lower-level in-
formation cannot affect higher-level processing.
In the model of Levelt et al. (1999), there is feedback be-
tween the conceptual and lemma levels. Because these levels
are shared between production and comprehension, informa-
tion would be expected to flow in both directions. Processing
at the lemma and word-form levels is strictly sequential.
Thus, in this model, word-form retrieval only begins after a
lemma has been selected. In cascaded models, by contrast,
each lemma that receives some activation from the concep-
tual level spreads some of its activation to the corresponding
word form, so that several word forms may be active at once.
In priming experiments, Levelt, Schriefers, Vorberg, Meyer,
Pechmann, and Havinga (1991) found no evidence for simul-
taneous activation of the forms of competing lemmas. How-
ever, Peterson and Savoy (1998) showed that near-synonyms
such as couch and sofa may simultaneously activate their
forms. Levelt et al. proposed that in such cases, speakers may
have failed to unambiguously select one lemma. An impor-
tant argument for feedback from lower to higher levels of
processing is that speech errors in which the target and out-
come are related in both form and meaning (as in cat for rat)
occur far more often than would be expected if lemma and
word form were selected independently (e.g., Dell, 1986,
1988). To account for this finding within a serial stage model,
Levelt et al. proposed that people are particularly likely to
overlook such errors when they monitor their speech.
Generation of Sentences in Spoken
Language Production
We now consider how speakers generate longer utterances,
such as descriptions of scenes or events. The first step is again
conceptual preparation—deciding what to say. Evidently,
conceptual preparation is more complex for longer than for
shorter utterances. To make a complicated theoretical argu-
ment or to describe a series of events, the speaker needs a
global plan (see Levelt, 1989). Each part of the plan must be
elaborated, perhaps via intermediate stages, until a represen-
tational level is reached that consists of lexical concepts. This
representation, the message, forms the input to linguistic
planning. Utterances comprising several sentences are rarely
laid out entirely before linguistic planning begins. Instead, all
current theories of sentence generation assume that speakers
prepare utterances incrementally. That is, they initiate lin-
guistic planning as soon as they have selected the first few
lexical concepts and prepare the rest later, either while they
are speaking or between parts of the utterance. Speakers can
probably choose conceptual planning units of various sizes,
but the typical unit for many situations appears to correspond
roughly to a clause (Bock & Cutting, 1992).
When speakers plan sentences, they retrieve words as de-
scribed earlier. However, because sentences are not simply
sets of words but have syntactic structure, speakers must
apply syntactic knowledge to generate sentences. Follow-
ing Garrett (1975), models of sentence production generally
assume that two distinct sets of processes are involved
in generating syntactic structure (Bock & Levelt, 1994;
Levelt, 1989). The first set, often called functional planning
processes, assigns grammatical functions, such as subject,
verb, or direct object, to lemmas. These processes rely pri-
marily on information from the message level and the syntac-
tic properties of the retrieved lemmas. The second set of
processes, often called positional encoding, uses the retrieved
lemmas and the functions to which they have been assigned
in order to generate syntactic structures that capture the de-
pendencies among constituents and their order. In English,
the mapping from the functional to the positional level is
usually quite straightforward: The subject usually precedes
the verb, and the direct object and indirect object follow it.
However, inversions can occur, as in I don’t mind bikes; cars
I hate.
Evidence for the distinction between functional and posi-
tional processes comes from the finding that some speech er-
rors (e.g., exchanges of words from different phrases, as in
put the tables on the plate) can best be explained as errors of
functional encoding. Other errors with different properties
(e.g., shifts of morphemes within phrases, as in the come
homing of the queen) can best be explained as errors of posi-
tional encoding. The distinction is further supported by the
results of structural priming studies. In such studies, people
first hear or say a sentence such as The woman shows the man
the dress. They later see a picture that can be described using
the same kind of structure (e.g., The boy gives the teacher the
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flowers) or a different one (The boy gives the flowers to the
teacher). Speakers tend to repeat the structure used on previ-
ous trials, even when the words featured in prime and target
sentences are different and even when the events are unre-
lated. The results of many such studies strongly suggest that
the priming effect arises during the positional encoding
processes (Bock, 1986; Bock & Loebell, 1990; Chang, Dell,
Bock, & Griffin, 2000).
As we have noted, grammatical encoding begins with the
assignment of lemmas to grammatical functions. This map-
ping process is largely determined by conceptual information.
In studies of functional encoding, speakers are often asked to
describe pictures of scenes or events or to recall sentences
from memory; the recall task involves the reconstruction of
the surface structure of the utterance on the basis of stored
conceptual information. Many such studies have focused on
the question of which part of the conceptual structure will be
assigned the role of grammatical subject (e.g., McDonald,
Bock, & Kelly, 1993). The results show that function assign-
ment is strongly affected by the relative availability or
salience of concepts. If a concept is very salient—for example,
because it has recently been referred to or because it is the only
concrete or animate entity to be mentioned—it is likely to be-
come the sentence subject.As soon as the subject role has been
filled, the positional processes can generate the corresponding
fragment of the phrase structure and the retrieval of the phono-
logical form of the subject noun phrase can begin.
Events or actions are often encoded in a verb. As noted
earlier, verb lemmas specify the arguments that the verbs
require. Pickering and Branigan (1998) proposed to repre-
sent this information in nodes, which receive activation from
verb lemmas. For instance, the lemma for give is con-
nected to two syntactic nodes, one representing the NP-NP
(noun phrase–noun phrase) node and the other the NP-PP
(noun phrase–prepositional phrase) node. Selection of the
NP-NP node results in a double object construction such as
the baby gives the dog a cookie. Selection of the NP-PP node
yields a prepositional phrase structure, as in the baby gives a
cookie to the dog.
Many verbs, such as give, license more than one syntactic
structure. Speeded sentence production experiments carried
out by Ferreira (1996) show that the alternative syntactic
structures associated with verb lemmas do not compete with
each other but instead represent different options for generat-
ing sentences. This explains why, under certain conditions,
speakers are faster to complete sentences with alternator
verbs (e.g., to give) than sentences with nonalternator verbs
(e.g., to donate). Ferreira proposed that a speaker’s choice
among the structures permitted by an alternator verb de-
pends, in part, on the salience of the lemmas assigned to the
patient and recipient roles. If the patient is very salient, the
corresponding fragment of the sentence will be built early.
This encourages the generation of an NP-NP construction in
which the patient is expressed early (give the dog a cookie).
If the direct object is highly activated, an NP-PP construction
will be more likely (give the cookie to the dog). Ferreira and
Dell (2000) proposed that in general, the choice of syntactic
structure may depend largely on the availability of lemmas
filling different thematic roles. If a lemma is highly available,
it will be processed early at the functional and positional lev-
els and will thus appear early in the sentence. Whether lemma
availability by itself is sufficient to explain how speakers
choose between alternative word orders remains to be
determined.
Certain elements within well-formed sentences must agree
with one another. In English, subject and verb must agree in
number, as must pronouns and their noun antecedents. In lan-
guages such as German, Dutch, Italian, and French, nouns
have grammatical gender, and there is gender agreement be-
tween nouns and determiners, adjectives, and pronouns.
Number agreement and grammatical gender agreement differ
in that number information usually stems from the conceptual
level, whereas grammatical gender is specified as part of the
noun lemma. Consequently, different mechanisms are likely
to be involved in generating the two types of agreement. We
briefly consider each type of agreement, beginning with
English number agreement.
In most cases, the mapping from conceptual number onto
the lemma level is straightforward: The singular form of a
noun is chosen to refer to one entity, and the plural form to
refer to two or more entities. Because number is coded at
both the conceptual and grammatical levels, speakers could
use either or both types of information to generate agreement.
What information do speakers actually use? According to a
strictly modular theory of language production, the grammat-
ical coding process should be sensitive only to grammatical
information. A more interactive theory would permit gram-
matical encoding processes to be affected by both grammati-
cal and conceptual information. To examine this issue,
researchers have studied agreement for collective nouns such
as fleet and gang, which are exceptions to the straightforward
mapping between conceptual and grammatical number. For
example, fleet is grammatically singular but refers to a group
of ships. The studies have often used sentence completion
tasks, in which speakers hear the beginnings of sentences
(e.g., The condition of the ship/ships/fleet/fleets . . .; Bock &
Eberhard, 1993), repeat the fragments, and then complete
them to form full sentences. When the two nouns in the
fragment differ in number, speakers sometimes make agree-
ment errors (The condition of the ships were poor).
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Most studies using sentence completion tasks like those
just described have found that speakers rely primarily on
grammatical information to generate subject-verb agreement.
For instance, agreement errors appear to be no more likely for
the condition of the fleet than for the condition of the ship, but
such errors are more common for the condition of the ships
(Bock & Eberhard, 1993; Bock & Miller, 1991; but see
Vigliocco, Butterworth, & Garrett, 1996). In contrast, studies
of noun-pronoun agreement in American English have shown
that this type of agreement is primarily based on conceptual
number information (Bock, 1995; Bock, Nicol, & Cutting,
1999). Thus, speakers are likely to say, The gang with the
dangerous rival armed themselves, using the plural pronoun
themselves to refer to a collective (Bock et al., 1999).
Whereas number information usually originates at the
conceptual level, grammatical gender is lexical information
and gender agreement can therefore be achieved only by con-
sulting grammatical information. For determiner-noun agree-
ment (as in Dutch het huis; the house, neuter gender, and de
kerk; the church, nonneuter gender), most theories invoke a
mechanism of indirect selection. In the model proposed by
Jescheniak and Levelt (1994) for Dutch, each noun lemma is
connected to one of two gender nodes (neuter or nonneuter).
Each gender node is connected to the lemma for the deter-
miner that is appropriate for that gender. Activation flows
from a selected noun lemma to the gender node and from
there to the determiner lemma, which can then be selected as
well (see Miozzo & Caramazza, 1999, for a model for Italian,
in which determiner-noun agreement is more complex).
Determiners are special in that their choice is governed ex-
clusively by the grammatical gender of the noun. Other forms
of agreement involve independently selected words. For in-
stance, the lemmas of adjectives are selected on the basis of
conceptual information and are then, in some languages,
marked depending on the grammatical gender of the noun to
which they refer. In French and Italian, agreement errors be-
tween adjectives and nouns—such as the French la sortie (f)
du tunnel (m) glissant (m) instead of la sortie (f) du tunnel (m)
glissante (f), the way out of the slippery tunnel—are less likely
for animate subjects, which have natural gender in addition to
grammatical gender, than for inanimate subjects, which have
grammatical gender alone (Vigliocco & Franck, 1999). Such
results suggest that agreement processes, although primarily
guided by syntactic information, can get support from the
conceptual level if gender is marked there as well.
When the positional representation for an utterance frag-
ment has been generated, the corresponding phonological
form can be built. For each word, phonological segments
and, when necessary, information about the word’s stress pat-
tern are retrieved from the mental lexicon as described ear-
lier. But the phonological form of a phrase is not just a con-
catenation of the forms of words as pronounced in isolation.
Instead, the stored word forms are combined into new
prosodic units (Nespor & Vogel, 1986; Wheeldon, 2000). We
have already discussed the syllable, a small prosodic unit.
The next larger unit is the phonological word. Phonological
words often correspond to lexical words. However, a mor-
phologically complex word may comprise several phonolog-
ical words, and unstressed items such as conjunctions and
pronouns combine with preceding or following content
words into single phonological words. Phonological words
are the domain of syllabification. Thus, when a speaker says
find it, two morphemes are retrieved, and these are combined
to form one phonological word. In line with the tendency for
the onsets of English syllables to contain as much material as
possible, /d/ is assigned to the second syllable, yielding [fain]
[dIt]. Thus syllables can, and often do, straddle the bound-
aries of lexical words.
The next level in the prosodic hierarchy is the phonologi-
cal phrase. Phonological phrases often correspond to syntac-
tic phrases, but long syntactic phrases may be divided into
several phonological phrases. Like the phonological word,
the phonological phrase is a domain of application for certain
phonological rules. These include the rule of English that
changes the stress patterns of words to generate an alternating
pattern (as in the typical pronunciation of the phrase Chinese
menu) and the rule that lengthens the final syllable of the
phrase. Finally, phonological phrases combine into intona-
tional phrases, which were mentioned in the discussion of
spoken language comprehension.
Earlier, we discussed the decomposition of morphemes into
segments. This may have appeared to be a vacuous process.
Why should morphemes first be decomposed into segments
that are later reassembled into syllables? The likely answer
is that the same morpheme can be pronounced in different
ways depending on the context. For instance, hand may lose its
final consonant in put your hand down and may gain a final [m]
in handbag. Hand corresponds to a syllable in I hand you the
book but not in I am handing you the book. There are phono-
logical rules governing how words are pronounced in different
environments. For these rules to apply, the individual segments
must be available to the processor. In connected speech, the de-
composition of morphemes and the reassembly into phonolog-
ical forms is not a vacuous process but yields phonological
forms that differ from those stored in the mental lexicon.
Written Language Production
Many of the steps in the production of written language are
similar to those in the production of spoken language. A
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major difference is that after a lemma and its morphological
representation have been accessed, it is the orthographic
rather than the phonological form that must be retrieved and
produced. Phonology plays an important role in this process,
just as it does in the process of deriving meaning from print
in reading. Support for this view comes from a study in which
speakers of French were shown drawings of such objects as a
seal (phoque) and a pipe (pipe) and were asked to write their
names as quickly as they could (Bonin, Peereman, & Fayol,
2001). The time needed to initiate writing was longer for
items such as phoque, for which the initial phoneme has an
unusual spelling (/f/ is usually spelled as f in French), than for
items such as pipe, for which the initial phoneme is spelled in
the typical manner. Thus, even when a to-be-spelled word is
not presented orally, its phonological form appears to be in-
volved in the selection of the spelling.
A number of the same issues that were raised earlier about
the derivation of phonology from orthography in reading
arise with respect to the derivation of orthography from
phonology in spelling. For instance, issues about grain size
apply to spelling as well as to reading. Kessler and Treiman
(2001) have shown that the spelling of an English segment
becomes more predictable when neighboring segments are
taken into account. The largest effects involve the vowel and
the coda, suggesting that rimes play a special role in English
spelling. Feedback between production and comprehension
is another issue that arises in spelling as well as in reading:
We may read a spelling back to check whether it is correct.
Writing differs from speaking in that writers often have
more time available for conceptual preparation and planning.
They may have more need to do so as well, as the intended
reader of a written text is often distant in time and space from
the writer. Monitoring and revising, too, typically play a
greater role in writing than in speaking. For these reasons,
much of the research on writing (see Kellogg, 1994; Levy &
Ransdell, 1996) has concentrated on the preparation and
revision processes rather than on the sentence generation and
lexical access processes that have been the focus of spoken
language production research.
CONCLUSIONS
We have talked about language comprehension and language
production in separate sections of this chapter, but the two
processes are carried out in the same head, presumably using
many of the same representations and processes. In some
cases, there have been strong claims that each of these two
aspects of language relies heavily on the other. For example,
some theories of speech perception (Liberman & Mattingly,
1985) maintain that listeners perceive speech sounds by mak-
ing unconscious reference to the articulatory gestures of the
speaker in a process referred to as analysis by synthesis. As
another example, speech production researchers have de-
scribed how speakers can listen to their own speech and cor-
rect themselves when necessary, and how speakers can even
monitor an internal version of their speech and interrupt
themselves before an anticipated error occurs (see Levelt,
1983; Postma, 2000).
Although researchers have described how comprehension
and production may interact in particular tasks, the two areas
of research have not always been closely connected. One rea-
son for this separation is that different methods traditionally
have been used to study comprehension and production. Lan-
guage comprehension researchers have often measured how
long it takes people to carry out tasks such as word naming,
lexical decision making, or reading for comprehension. These
experimental paradigms are designed to tap the time course of
processing. Language production research has traditionally
focused on product rather than process, as in analyses of
speech errors and written productions. However, researchers
in the area of language production are increasingly using re-
action time paradigms (e.g., the structural priming technique
mentioned earlier) to yield more direct evidence about the
time course of processing. Stronger connections between
the two areas are expected to develop with the increasing sim-
ilarity in the research tools and the increasing interest in time-
course issues in the production arena.
Another reason that production research and comprehen-
sion research have been somewhat separate from one another
is that researchers in the two areas have sometimes focused
on different topics and talked about them in different ways.
For example, the concept of a lemma or syntactic word unit
plays a central role in some theories of language production,
with theorists such as Levelt et al. (1999) assuming that lem-
mas are shared between production and comprehension.
However, most researchers in the area of comprehension
have not explicitly used the concept of a lemma in discussing
the structure of the mental lexicon and have not considered
which of the representations inferred through comprehension
experiments might also play a role in production. An impor-
tant direction for the future will be to increase the links be-
tween theories of comprehension and production.
Despite these gaps, it is clear that both comprehension and
production are strongly driven by the mental lexicon. When
listeners hear utterances, they rapidly map the speech stream
onto entries in the lexicon. As each word is identified, se-
mantic and syntactic information becomes available. This
information is immediately used to begin constructing the
syntactic structure and meaning of the utterance. Similarly,
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when speakers generate utterances, they select words from
the lexicon. Each word brings with it syntactic and morpho-
logical properties, and these properties are taken into account
when additional words are chosen. A theory based on analysis
by synthesis is probably not appropriate for syntactic compre-
hension, but there may be strong similarities between the rou-
tines involved in parsing and those involved in grammatical
encoding in language production (Vosse & Kempen, 2000).
Given the importance of the lexicon in all aspects of language
processing, the nature and organization of the stored informa-
tion and the processes that are involved in accessing this in-
formation are likely to continue as major topics of research.
In addition to developing closer ties between comprehen-
sion and production, it will be important to build bridges be-
tween studies of the processing of isolated words and studies of
sentences and texts. For example, theories of word recognition
have focused on how readers and listeners access phonological
and, to a lesser extent, morphological information. They have
paid little attention to how people access the syntactic infor-
mation that is necessary for sentence processing and compre-
hension. Further work is needed, too, on the similarities and
differences between the processing of written language and the
processing of spoken language. Given the importance of
prosody in spoken language comprehension, for example, we
need to know more about its possible role in reading.
Many of the theoretical debates within the field of psy-
cholinguistics apply to both comprehension and production
and to both spoken language and written language. For ex-
ample, issues about the balance between computation and
storage arise in all of these domains. Clearly, a good deal of
information must be stored in the mental lexicon, including
the forms of irregular verbs such as went. Are forms that
could in principle be derived by rule (e.g., walked) computed
each time they are heard or said, are they stored as ready-
made units, or are both procedures available? Such issues
have been debated in both the comprehension and production
literatures, and will be important topics for future research.
Another broad debate is that between interactive and modular
views. As we have seen, there is no clear resolution to this
debate. It has been difficult to determine whether there is a
syntactic component in language production that operates in-
dependently of conceptual and phonological factors. Simi-
larly, comprehension researchers have found it difficult to
determine whether an initial analysis that considers a re-
stricted range of information is followed by a later and
broader process, or whether a wide range of linguistic and
nonlinguistic information is involved from the start. The
speed at which language is produced and understood may
make it impossible to resolve these questions. However,
asking the questions has led researchers to seek out and at-
tempt to understand important phenomena, and this may be
the best and most lasting outcome of the debate.
The debate between rule-based and statistical views of
language processing provides a good example of how theo-
retical tensions and the research they engender has furthered
progress in psycholinguistics. Statistical approaches, as em-
bodied in connectionist models, have served the field well by
emphasizing that certain aspects of language involve proba-
bilistic patterns. In reading, for example, -ove is often pro-
nounced as /ov/ but is sometimes pronounced as /v/ (as in
love) or /uv/ (as in move). People appear to pick up and use
statistical information of this kind in reading and other areas
of language processing. In such cases, we do well to go be-
yond the notion of all-or-none rules. We must keep in mind,
however, that many linguistic patterns are all-or-none. For
example, nouns and adjectives in French always agree in
gender. Our ability to follow such patterns, as well as our
ability to make some sense of sentences like Colorless green
ideas sleep furiously, suggests that Chomsky’s notion of lan-
guage as an internalized system of rules still has an important
place to play in views of language processing.
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